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The analysis of active labour market policies (ALMP) at the macroeconomic level measures net effects 
on labour market outcomes. These net effects consist of direct treatment effects on participants as 
well as indirect effects on non-participants and on the economy as a whole, e.g. deadweight, 
substitution and displacement effects. This paper contributes to the empirical studies of 
macroeconometric evaluation of ALMP by considering the regional effects on both the matching 
process and the job-seeker rate. This joint view permits us to draw conclusions on how ALMP 
achieves the goals set by policy makers. To this end, we use an exclusive data set on Austrian job-
seekers in the years 2001 to 2007 and employ contemporaneous GMM and quasi-ML estimators to 
take into account both the simultaneity of ALMP and spatial interrelations between employment office 
districts. The empirical results indicate that a large number of participants in job schemes in the non-
profit sector, wage subsidies, and apprenticeships cause particularly favourable effects on the regional 
matching function and the job-seeker rate. 
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1. Introduction 
In comparison with the majority of the European countries, the unemployment rate in Austria 
is relatively low. Nonetheless, the Austrian government recognises the need to have an 
effective framework of active labour market policies (ALMP) to prevent the problem of 
unemployment from becoming more severe. The objectives of the Public Employment 
Service Austria (Arbeitsmarktservice Österreich - AMS) stipulate an increase in the relevance 
of activation strategies. Early intervention by means of ALMP aims to achieve a rapid and 
sustainable integration of job-seekers in non-subsidised employment. To accomplish this, the 
objectives of Austrian ALMP can be divided into three groups: 
  Prevention and reduction of unemployment by creating and securing jobs 
  Improvement of the matching process by eliminating placement barriers and 
increasing the chances of re-integration 
  Integration into regular employment.  
 
The aim of this study is to investigate whether ALMP is able to achieve these goals by 
looking at the effectiveness of various instruments of ALMP in Austria. There are two 
dimensions of how effectiveness can be perceived. The first is if an instrument has the 
intended impact on those job-seekers who participate. The second is if individual effects are 
strong enough to provide positive effects for the whole economy. 
Most commonly, the individual dimension is analysed by microeconometric evaluation 
studies. Generally, the focus is on whether an individual improved his/her position by 
participating in an ALMP measure. However, it is complicated to isolate the actual treatment 
effect, because this would require knowledge about what would have happened if the person 
had not participated. The outcome of non-treatment, given a person did participate, is 
unobservable. An experimental approach – randomly assigning ALMP instruments to job-
seekers – would not be practicable. In a non-experimental setting, participants and non-
participants might very well differ systematically in their characteristics. There are several 
microeconometric approaches that try to take this into account, the most important examples 
being methods of matching, difference-in-differences estimators and instrument variable 
approaches. These use different identifying assumptions to estimate the average treatment 
effect on the treated. 
There are already some micro evaluation analyses for Austria (cf. Winter-Ebmer and 
Zweimüller 1996; Hofer and Weber 2004; Lutz, Mahringer and Pöschl 2005; Lechner et al. 
2007; Lechner and Wiehler 2007a; 2007b). Lutz et al. (2005) find in their empirical study that 
especially wage subsidies and job creation schemes in non-profit organisations and in socioeconomic enterprises increase employment and reduce unemployment during a period 
of 3 years after program start. The effects of qualification measures are small because of the 
lock-in effects during the participation in this program. The empirical results of Lechner and 
Wiehler (2007a;b) point out that the various labour market programs have no significant 
employment and unemployment effects for men during 32 months after program entry. 
However female participants experience an increase in employment rates for active job 
search, qualification measures, course subsidies and for measures in socioeconomic 
enterprises. Considering the unemployment effects for women only course subsidies reduce 
unemployment at the end of the observation period. 
One of the basic assumptions of such microeconomic evaluation studies is the stable unit 
treatment value assumption (SUTVA, cf. Rubin 1980). This implies that one individual’s 
treatment effect is independent of other individuals’ treatments, which excludes spillover 
effects between participants and non-participants. This might hold true in countries where 
ALMP plays a minor role, like in the United States. In Europe, however, where spending on 
ALMP is very high, the SUTVA may not be completely justified. It is often suspected that 
individual effects on participants are weakened or even reversed by indirect effects at the 
macroeconomic level.  
Recent evaluation literature commonly distinguishes between deadweight, substitution and 
displacement effects (cf. Calmfors 1994). These effects are mainly associated with wage 
subsidies and job-creation schemes. Deadweight losses occur e.g. when an employee would 
also have been hired without wage subsidies. The substitution effect means that subsidised 
employment changes relative wage costs and simply redistributes employment opportunities 
between different groups of job-seekers. Finally, when firms improve their competitiveness 
by reducing labour costs due to subsidised employment, they displace other firms that do not 
use this measure. What all of these effects have in common is that even if there were a 
positive effect on participants, it could disappear at the aggregate level. Thus, the positive 
effects of job subsidies on participants which are found in the micro-economic studies for 
Austria could only take effect at the expense on negative indirect effects on non-participants. 
 To get a complete picture about the effectiveness of ALMP it is sensible to complement the 
microeconomic studies by taking into account these spillovers and indirect effects on non-
participants and analyse the net effects of ALMP on the whole economy. Motivated by the 
seminal work of Calmfors and Skedinger (1995), a wide range of international studies on the 
macroeconometric effects of ALMP has been published. In this paper we conduct the first 
macroeconometric evaluation study of Austrian ALMP.
2 The macroeconometric framework 
                                                 
2 An exception is an analysis on the macroeconomic level that uses a simulation model and finds 
particularly strong effects of wage subsidies to increase the number of persons in employment 
and reduce the number unemployed people (cf. Lutz, Mahringer and Pöschl 2005). allows us to measure net effects that consist of direct treatment effects on participants as 
well as indirect effects on non-participants and on the economy as a whole. However, in 
general it is not possible to distinguish between these different components such as the 
direct treatment effect, the substitution effect, etc. To look inside this “black box” of net 
effects, we consider two different aggregate labour market outcomes, the number of matches 
in a region and the regional job-seeker rate, and analyse how they are affected by the 
participation of job-seekers in eight programme categories. By analysing the differences of 
the estimation results for both outcome variables, we are able to present statements on the 
tendency of the different effects. This permits a more in-depth view of the functionality of 
ALMP. 
A central question is how to measure the extent to which changes in the number of 
participants in an ALMP instrument affect the region’s outcome. Since there is a wide range 
of factors that can exert an influence on an outcome like the regional job-seeker rate, it is 
essential to isolate real causal effects. The “gold standard” would be a random experiment 
where a causal effect would be equal to the difference in outcomes (cf. Fertig and Schmidt 
2000). Since this is hardly feasible, the best alternative in this context is a linear regression 
model. Instead of searching for “statistical twins” like in a matching approach, all other 
regions serve as a region’s control group. Controlling for regional characteristics, the 
regression coefficients can be interpreted as ceteris paribus effects of how a change in a 
region’s number of participants in an ALMP instrument affects the regional outcome. The use 
of panel data makes it possible to take into account unobserved heterogeneity as well as 
persistence of unemployment and temporally delayed effects. Our analysis draws on a 
unique panel data set which has been constructed from process data of the AMS, exclusively 
for the purpose of this evaluation study. This extensive data comprises information on the 
structure of all job-seekers and ALMP participants in 86 regional branch office districts of the 
AMS in the quarters of 2001 to 2007. 
As Hujer, Rodrigues and Wolf (2009), we also consider the spatial dimension of these 
effects. Since regions are subject to manifold spatial interrelations, ignoring the 
neighbourhood or proximity of regional labour markets could lead to misleading inference 
(Baltagi and Pirotte 2010). This problem is aggravated by the fact that administrative districts 
do not coincide with functional labour market regions. Thus, effects may very well operate 
across regional borders. We use contemporaneous GMM and quasi-ML estimation 
techniques to take persistence and adjustment mechanisms into account. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents the theoretical 
framework for modelling the effects of ALMP on regional labour markets and particularly the 
effects on the matching process and the job-seeker rate. Section 3 introduces the 
institutional background of ALMP in Austria, while section 4 describes the data basis of the empirical analysis. Sections 5 and 6 present the estimation approach and the results of the 
matching function and the Beveridge curve respectively. Section 7 provides a summary of 
the results and section 8 concludes. 
2. Theoretical considerations 
When ALMP is evaluated at the macroeconomic level, it is essential to take into account the 
broad range of effects that are caused by these policy measures, i.e. direct effects on the 
participants as well as indirect effects on non-participants which can be either positive or 
negative. Modifying the labour market model of Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), 
Calmfors (1994) developed an extensive theoretical model, which has formed the basis for a 
large number of evaluation studies from various countries. We follow the same line of 
argumentation but extend the models in some places to include recent developments. 
Basically, ALMP programmes can affect the process of matching job-seekers and vacancies, 
can increase the welfare of the unemployed, but also their competition, and can motivate 
people to participate in the labour market in the first place. It can increase labour productivity 
and finally lead to a decrease in unemployment. In this paper we analyse the effects of 
ALMP on the matching process and its impact on the regional job-seeker rate. 
To analyse the effects of AMLP on the matching process we use an extension of the 
standard matching function as theoretical approach to model frictions on the labour market. It 
uses the hypothesis that filling a vacancy follows a production process. The output “number 
of new matches” M  of job-seekers and firms during a given period of time is a function of 
two inputs: the stock of job-seekers S  and vacancies V  at the beginning of the period (cf. 
Pissarides (1990)):
3 
) , ( V S m A M ,  (1) 
where  A represents the matching technology that varies between regions and periods but 
does not depend on S  and V . The number of matches rises along with the number of job-
seekers and vacancies respectively ( 0 S m  and  0 V m ). Generally a Cobb-Douglas 
approach is assumed as an empirical specification: 
V S A M .  (2) 
Holding the number of job-seekers and vacancies constant, a higher number of matches can 
also be obtained when, for example, job-seekers’ profiles are adjusted to suit the vacancies 
                                                 
3 For a discussion of whether stocks – like here and in the traditional version – or entries of job-
seekers and vacancies are relevant for the matching function, cf. e.g. Coles and Smith (1998) or 
Coles and Petrongolo (2002). by means of ALMP, such as training programmes. In order to include explicitly the potential 
effects of ALMP on the matching process, it is necessary to assume that job-seekers are not 
homogenous but can differ in their search effectiveness and intensity. Following Lehmann 
(1995) and Puhani (1999), we use the following extended matching function: 
V cS A M ) ( ,  (3) 
where c  is the average search effectiveness of job-seekers. ALMP  P  is included in the 
model by defining c  as, 
) 1 ( P s c P ,  (4) 
where   is the average search effectiveness of unemployed individuals (with no active 
labour market policies) and  P s  is the influence of ALMP on the search effectiveness. Thus, 
0 P s  implies that ALMP increases the search effectiveness of programme participants. 
This can be due to a reduction in sectoral, regional and qualification mismatch, improved 
information on job-seekers or an increase in the search intensity (cf. Calmfors 1994).  
To reduce qualification mismatch, training programmes are used, while mobility assistance 
can reduce regional imbalances. ALMP can serve as a screening function to improve 
information on the job-seekers, which also increases the matching efficiency. An employer 
can use wage subsidies to obtain an on-the-job impression of a job-seeker’s skills. This 
reduces the uncertainty of a future non-subsidised contract. Another advantage is that a job-
seeker can improve his/her chances of finding a job when applying while in an employment 
relationship rather than while unemployed. Eriksson and Lagerström (2006) find evidence 
that this indeed increases the probability of a successful application. However, it remains 
unclear whether this simply means a redistribution of job opportunities from participants and 
the regular unemployed or if there is really increased competition with job-to-job changers. 
Finally, to improve the search intensity, specific short-term measures can provide job-
seekers with training on how to write a promising application or teach basic skills to socially 
challenged people. However, many other measures such as full-time training courses or 
subsidised full-time employment are rather time-consuming. For the duration of the measure, 
participants are “locked in” (cf. Kluve 2006). Instead of increasing their search efforts, they 
might postpone job search until the measure is finished. Thus, when the effects of 
participants in ALMP measures are analysed, there might be a time lag until positive effects 
become visible. If some participants would have found a job without the measure, the effect 
of the number of current participants can even be negative. If, on the other hand, participants 
accept job offers during the participation, one could expect that this is not because of the 
treatment effect and would also have happened without participation. In an empirical 
analysis, this would lead to insignificant results. Equation (3) serves as the basis for a large number of empirical evaluation studies at the 
macroeconomic level (e.g. Hujer and Zeiss 2003). An alternative model to include ALMP in 
the standard matching function has been developed by Wapler, Werner and Wolf (2008). 
They explicitly include two separate groups of job-seekers as input factors: 
             re        whe ) , ( P U S V P s U m M P .  (5) 
P s  is the search effectiveness of programme participants  P , while the search effectiveness 
of registered unemployed people U  is normalised to one. Here,  1 P s  implies that a larger 
share of job-seekers participating in an ALMP programme increases the aggregate matching 
effectiveness. Holding the numbers of job-seekers and vacancies constant, a higher number 
of transitions from job search to employment can be achieved. This approach makes it 
possible to extend the number of groups of job-seekers even further. Following Wapler, 
Werner, Wolf (2008), we distinguish between job-seekers that are currently participating in 
ALMP programmes, those that participated in the past and others that have never 
participated. In this way we can take into account the fact that search effectiveness is not 
increased until a participant has finished a measure, while participants are “locked in” for the 
duration of the measure. 
Using a matching function as theoretical framework, we focus on how ALMP affects different 
types of job-seekers, e.g. if ALMP helps to increase the outflows from unemployment into 
employment. However, there could also be other effects of ALMP that affect not only job-
seekers, but the (regional) labour market as a whole. The possibility of participation in an 
ALMP measure increases the wellbeing of job-seekers and thus reduces the disutility of 
becoming or remaining unemployed. In the framework of wage determination models (such 
as bargaining or efficiency wage theories) this strengthens employees’ bargaining position, 
thus increasing wage pressure. This effect would lead to a reduction in employment and an 
increase of unemployment. Other effects can also lead to a decrease in wage pressure. 
ALMP could make outsiders “fit” for competing with other workers (“competition effect”, cf. 
Calmfors and Lang 1995) or motivate people to participate in the labour force in the first 
place (i.e. reduce the “discouraged worker effect”). This increase in the labour supply might 
lead to lower wages, which would result in higher employment according to the underlying 
labour market model. Since both employment and the labour supply increase, the effect on 
the equilibrium rate of unemployment remains unclear. However, newer models at the 
individual level show that ALMP can also have negative effects on the participation rate. 
Being forced to attend a measure might be perceived as a “leisure tax” which reduces the 
utility from unemployment. One result of this changed utility function might be a complete 
withdrawal from labour market participation (cf. Büttner 2007; Rosholm and Svarer 2008), which leads to a decrease in labour supply and therefore also to a decrease in 
unemployment. 
ALMP can also change aggregate labour demand. Job training can increase labour 
productivity and prevent or slow down the depreciation of human capital during longer 
periods of unemployment (cf. Calmfors 1994). Improving the matching process also reduces 
hiring costs, which might lead to an increase in the number of vacancies (cf. Pissarides 
1990).  
We consider these potentially positive or negative effects by analysing the effects of ALMP 
on the regional job-seeker rate. To this end, the standard Beveridge curve serves as the 
underlying theoretical framework. This is an inverse, convex relation of unemployment and 
vacancies (cf. Beveridge 1945; Blanchard and Diamond 1989). All points on the Beveridge 
curve represent a state of equilibrium where hirings and lay-offs are balanced. When the 
stocks of both job-seekers and vacancies are quantitatively equal, a state of full employment 
could be assumed. However, even in this case, there are several mechanisms that prevent 
market clearing. Since it almost always takes some time for an individual to find a new job 
after having been laid off, there will be frictional unemployment. As this might lead to a more 
efficient allocation of workers, it may even be desirable. Another reason for market clearing 
not being achieved is a qualitative incompatibility between supply and demand. This might be 
due to a mismatch in the regional economic structure, qualification mismatch or mobility 
barriers. The location of the Beveridge curve represents the magnitude of this mismatch. 
Time-series or panel data can be used to produce an aggregate or regional Beveridge curve 
empirically (cf. Börsch-Supan 1991; Wall and Zoega 2002). When considering a Beveridge 
curve at the regional level, regional resource endowments must be taken into account. To 
take the variation in the size of the regions into account, both the number of job seekers and 
the number of vacancies are divided by the size of the labour force. This serves as a starting 
point for the macroeconomic evaluation of ALMP. Ceteris paribus, effective ALMP decreases 
the mismatch, thus reducing unemployment while keeping the number of vacancies fixed (cf. 
Bleakley and Fuhrer 1997). 
3. Institutional background: ALMP in Austria 
Austrian labour market policies are organised by the AMS, a public enterprise which is 
subdivided into one federal organisation, nine state organisations and 104 regional branch 
offices. One of its tasks is to organise and finance the instruments of ALMP. The AMS 
employs a wide range of different instruments, which can be classified as training, 
employment and assistance schemes. Since the aim of assistance schemes as well as some 
others is financial coverage rather than the transition into non-subsidised employment, none 
of the instruments in this group is considered in this study. Other instruments are very small and thus unlikely to exhibit effects at the aggregate level. The nine remaining instruments, 
which are considered in this study, are briefly described in this section. 
Active Job Search / Aktive Arbeitssuche (AA): 
This is a relatively short training measure aimed at people who have been unemployed for a 
short time or have recently become employable. The topics are how to write a job application 
and curriculum vitae, training for job interviews etc. The aim is prompt re-employment. 
Job Training / Arbeitstraining (AT): 
This measure is specifically designed for long-term unemployed or people with social 
disadvantages. It aims to provide psychological and physical stability and impart a proper 
attitude to work, e.g. punctuality or reliability. 
Orientation / Orientierung (OR): 
This programme is intended to provide the qualifications for a reasonable further 
occupational guidance, participation in a further training measure or to make career 
decisions. The target group is young job-seekers or people who are having difficulties in 
defining job perspectives. 
Vocational training / Aus- und Weiterbildung (AW): 
Concerning this programme category the AMS distinguishes between initial vocational and 
further training. Their aim is to provide a vocational qualification or an additional qualification. 
Participants are intended to benefit from new, further or better qualifications and quickly find 
a new job after completing the measure. Considered over the whole observation period, this 
measure has the highest number of participants. 
Allowance for course costs / Kurskosten (KK): 
This labour market instrument grants allowances for the costs of promising vocational 
training schemes at private agencies to individuals who would otherwise not be able to 
participate in such a measure. The initiative for participating in these courses comes from the 
unemployed persons. 
Wage subsidies / Eingliederungsbeihilfe (EB): 
This measure is a wage subsidy for the hiring of long-term unemployed individuals. The aim 
is to integrate the long-term unemployed, to promote employment in the low-wage sector and 
to increase labour demand. Remarkably, employers are not legally obliged to continue the 
employment after the subsidy has expired. Job schemes in non-profit organisations and socioeconomic enterprises / 
Gemeinnützige Betriebe und Sozialökonomische Betriebe (GB/SÖB): 
Both of these programmes are intended to provide employment that is relatively close to the 
regular labour market to long-term unemployed and other problem groups. To avoid 
displacement of regular employment, these jobs have to be in non-profit fields of activity. 
Apprenticeships / Lehrstellen (LE): 
This measure provides apprenticeship training positions to challenged young persons. It has 
gained in importance, especially since 2006, and had become the largest measure by the 
end of the observation period. 
 
Table 1 around here 
Figure 1 around here 
4. Data basis 
This analysis uses a unique data basis from the Austrian Federal Ministry of Labour, Social 
Affairs and Consumer Protection and the Public Employment Service Austria (AMS). The 
origin of the data is the daily monitoring of the employment histories of all individuals subject 
to Austrian social security. Further processing of the raw data was carried out by our 
cooperation partners from Joanneum Research, Graz. In a first step, a basic table of stocks 
of relevant job-seekers on the reference dates (the last day of each quarter) was generated. 
Then the job-seekers were subdivided into distinct groups.
4 Current participants are those 
who were taking part in one of the relevant ALMP programmes as of the reference date. 
Former participants were not participating as of the reference date, but had completed 
participation at some time during the previous two quarters. Unemployed persons are the 
residual group of all job-seekers with no (current or previous) participation in any of the 
relevant programmes. Additionally, “soon-to-be former” participants were identified. These 
are current participants who concluded their participation within one half of our matching 
period after the reference date. This group is subtracted from the current participants and 
added to the former participants, since it can be assumed that they are comparable to the 
group of former participants. Their search intensity might be already increased at the end of 
the participation period and they already have a better qualification level than at the 
beginning of a measure. Finally, matches are identified as transitions from one of the 
previously mentioned groups into non-subsidised employment. This follows a stock-flow 
                                                 
4 Note, that these data deviate from those officially released by the AMS. This is because the 
definitions of unemployment, participation, etc. are adjusted to conform to the needs of the 
theoretical models. approach, where matches are only taken into account if they occur from the stock of relevant 
job-seekers. 
The data set is aggregated to 86 regional branch offices (the delineation of 2001) and the 
quarters from January-March 2001 to October-December 2007. For the estimation of the 
Beveridge model, data on employment in the place of residence are needed to calculate job-
seeker and vacancy rates. Since these data are only available from 2004, the data set had to 
be reduced to the years 2004 to 2007. 
To control for further influences on the variables of interest, data on the structure of job-
seekers and the general regional economic structure are added. Regarding the vacancies, 
this variable is flawed by the fact that only reported vacancies can be counted in the process 
data, which constitute only a fraction of all actual vacancies. Since there is no information on 
how the penetration rate varies between regions and over time, we do not attempt to correct 
this figure. Instead, we use the number of registered vacancies that are available 
immediately or soon as a proxy. 
5. Matching function 
5.1.  Specification and estimation 
To provide a differentiated view of the effects of ALMP on regional labour markets, two 
models are analysed. The first is how ALMP improves the matching process. The starting 
point to derive an empirical model is the matching function from section 2. Writing the model 
in logs, we obtain: 
rt r t rt rt rt d d V S a M 1 1 ln ln ln   (6) 
The observational unit is the regional branch office r  ( R r , , 1 ) at time t  ( T t , , 1 ). 
rt M represents the transitions of job-seekers to dependent, non-subsidised employment 
(matches) during a certain time period.  1 rt S  is the number of job-seekers and  1 rt V  the 
number of reported vacancies at the end of the previous period.
5 Furthermore, we include 
fixed effects for regions ( r d ) and periods ( t d ), to allow for variations in the matching 
technologies between regions and periods. The fixed region effects also capture structural 
features of the regions, while the time effects include macroeconomic effects like the 
business cycle as well as seasonal fluctuations. 
                                                 
5 Job-to-job changers are not considered at all. I.e., they are neither counted as job-seekers, nor do 
we count their matches. Cf. Burgess (1993) for an analysis of job-to-job changes within the 
framework of a matching function.  As described in section 2, it is necessary to divide job-seekers into groups that differ in their 
search effectiveness. Previously, only unemployed people and current participants were 
distinguished (e.g. Hujer, Rodrigues and Wolf 2009). To take into account delays of the 
positive impact due to lock-in effects, several temporally lagged values were also included. 
Following Wapler, Werner and Wolf (2008), we take a more direct approach. At all times, 
participants are subdivided into current and former participants. To implement this in the 
model, the number of effective job-seekers is defined as  Q s P s U X Q P  where  P s and 
Q s are the search effectiveness of current and former participants respectively (cf. Hynninen 
and Lahtonen 2007; Ibourk et al. 2004). The search effectiveness of the other job-seekers is 
normalised to one. Substituting  X for S  in equation 6, we obtain the following empirical 
model after some transformations: 
rt t r rt rt Q rt P rt rt d d V Q P S a M 1 1 1 1 ln
~ ~
ln ln   (7) 
where  Q P U S ,  ) 1 ( P P s ,  ) 1 ( Q Q s ,  S P P /
~
 and  S Q Q /
~
. Since 
current and former participants are measured as shares of all job-seekers, the structural 
parameters  P and  Q  represent the partial effects of a change in these shares. 
Assuming 1, 0 P  would mean that the search effectiveness of current participants ( P s ) 
is smaller than one, i.e. this group has a smaller search effectiveness than other job-seekers. 
On the other hand, 0 Q  would mean that the search effectiveness of former participants 
( Q s ) is greater than one. A positive effect on individual participants would then be visible at 
the aggregate level as well, and negative indirect effects are significantly smaller than 
positive treatment effects.  
Of course, effects can vary between different programmes. Thus, we extend equation (7) by 
including the shares of the individual programmes ( K k , , 1 ). To model adjustment 
mechanisms, we choose a dynamic specification and thus include a serially lagged 
dependent variable:  










1 1 1 ln
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The autoregressive parameter   shows how quickly the number of matches adjusts to 
altered conditions. The higher this coefficient, the longer these adjustment mechanisms take. 
To solve the problem of endogeneity in the dynamic panel model, we use the GMM estimator 
of Arellano and Bond (1991). This estimator uses a first differenced equation to eliminate the fixed effects and uses lagged levels of the dependent variable in earlier periods to provide 
internal instruments.  
Up to now, regions have been treated as independent units in space. Especially when a 
small level of regional aggregation is used, this assumption might not hold true. Branch office 
districts are not defined as functional labour market regions but are delineated for 
administrative purposes. Hence, nearby regions could not only be affected by common 
exposure to exogenous shocks, but influences on the matching process in one region could 
also directly affect the matching process in others. To take this cross-border influence into 
account, a spatially lagged dependent variable is included in the model (cf. Anselin 2002; 
Anselin et. al. 2008 for the general interpretation of a spatial lag model): 
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  (9) 
Matrix W is the  R R -dimensional spatial weights matrix. The coefficient of the spatial lag  
quantifies the strength of regional interrelations. An alternative specification would be to allow 
the error terms of nearby regions to be correlated. However, this would mean that regions 
could be hit by common shocks, but that direct effects could not reach beyond a region’s 
border. Conducting a macroeconomic evaluation study, Fertig, Schmidt and Schneider 
(2006) use robust Lagrange Multiplier tests to determine that a spatial lag model is the more 
appropriate one in a cross-sectional regression. Since respective tests are not available for a 
dynamic panel data regression, we rely on their finding and also estimate a spatial lag model. 
Since the spatial lag is also correlated with the error term, the estimation becomes more 
complicated. Conditioning on the first observation, Lee and Yu (2010) provide a quasi 
maximum likelihood estimator that solves the endogeneity of both (serial and spatial) lags. 
5.2.  Empirical results 
The starting point of the following empirical analysis is the simple matching function, where 
the log number of matches is regressed on the log number of job-seekers and the log 
number of vacancies as well as dummy variables for regions and periods. The results are 
displayed in the first column of Table 2. The coefficients of the log linear model can be 
interpreted as elasticities. Their sum is greater than one, which means that the Austrian 
matching function has increasing returns to scale in the observation period of 2001 to 2007. 
This can be explained by externalities in the search process, caused by a larger pool of 
potential matches for the firms to choose from (cf. Münich, Svenjar and Terrell 1998). The 
coefficient of the vacancies is rather small, which is in line with the findings of other studies 
that use matches of unemployed individuals instead of all hirings as the dependent variable. 
 Table 2 around here 
 
A first step to analyse the effects of ALMP is to extend the simple matching function to 
include the aggregate shares of current and former participants in any of the considered 
programmes (second column of Table 2). We also control for further influences of the 
structure of a region’s job-seekers and the regional labour market as a whole. These are the 
shares of different age and qualification groups as well as the shares of female and long-
term job-seekers and the share of job-seekers with a migration background. The regional 
labour market is represented by the participation rate and the share of employees in the 
tertiary sector. We find that regions with large shares of both job-seekers younger than 25 
and job-seekers older than 50 achieve significantly fewer matches, ceteris paribus. The 
same applies to regions with large shares of female and long-term job-seekers. 
The coefficients of the accommodation ratios have the expected signs: a larger share of 
current participants reduces the number of matches. However, this effect is not significant. 
Thus, the individual lock-in effect for participants, which was found in microeconometric 
studies, cannot be observed significantly at the regional level. Some of the “locked-in” 
participants can presumably be replaced by other job-seekers that are not participating in an 
ALMP programme. Due to this positive substitution effect, the aggregate number of 
transitions into employment is not affected and ALMP only changes the composition of the 
job-seekers that find a job. 
The share of former participants has a positive but insignificant effect. There are two possible 
explanations for this finding: first, there could be no positive effect at the individual level after 
participation, i.e. ALMP does not increase the individual likelihood of finding a job. When 
there is no effect at the individual level, one cannot be expected at a higher level. Second, 
the absence of a positive effect could be explained by the negative indirect effects described 
in section 1. In this case, there are positive effects at the individual level, which are balanced 
out by negative substitution effects. Former participants increase their prospects after 
completing their programme in comparison with other job-seekers. Again, the number of 
matches is not affected, while the chances of finding employment are redistributed among 
job-seekers. 
However, another possible explanation for not finding a positive effect is that different ALMP 
programmes are not considered separately. The heterogeneous nature of the programmes 
suggests that their effects on the number of matches should vary considerably. To take this 
into account, we include the shares of current and former participants in eight different 
programme categories. By including a serial lag, we also control for temporal adjustment 
mechanisms. Table 3 displays the results of this model. The first column is calculated by 
GMM and does not take spatial dependence into account. The second column represents the model with a spatially lagged dependent variable. The spatial lag is generated using a 
weights matrix based on driving times between regions. The raw matrix has ones where two 
regions are no more than one hour’s driving time apart and zero otherwise.
6 The weights 
matrix is then row-standardised, i.e. each row adds up to one. This way, the spatial lag is the 
weighted average of the dependent variable of all related regions. The results of the two 
models do not differ substantially. However, since the coefficient of the spatial lag is 
significantly larger than zero, we restrict the interpretation to the coefficients of this model.
7 
The positive coefficient of the spatially lagged variable means that there are effects that 
originate in some regions and take effect across borders in other regions. A consequence is 
that regions with similar numbers of matches are geographically clustered. This effect should 
not be interpreted as a regional reaction function to the dependent variable itself. It rather 
suggests the existence of unobserved factors that influence the number of matches similarly 
in nearby regions (cf. Fertig, Schmidt and Schneider 2006). If this spatial lag is not included, 
omitted variable bias might be the consequence. 
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Taking a look at the diagnostic tests of the non-spatial model, we find that the Sargan test 
does not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid at any level of significance. 
This strongly supports the assumption that the accommodation ratios of the ALMP 
programmes are not endogenous. It seems appropriate to assume that the number of 
participants in a given period does not depend on the matches in the subsequent period (cf. 
Hujer and Zeiss 2005; Fertig, Schmidt and Schneider 2006). Another important requirement 
for the instruments to be valid is the absence of higher order autocorrelation in the error 
terms. While first order autocorrelation arises by construction due to first differencing, the 
Arellano-Bond test does not indicate the presence of an AR2 process. Regarding these 
results, we are confident that further instrumenting of the accommodation ratios is not 
necessary in this context. 
A first look at the effects of ALMP supports the findings of the aggregate analysis above. The 
accommodation ratios of the current participants have negative effects in most cases, while 
three of them are even significant. Both job schemes in non-profit organisations and 
apprenticeships are programmes with comparatively long durations. The individual lock-in 
effect is very likely to increase with the duration of the programme, which in turn increases 
                                                 
6 Alternatives such as a simple contiguity matrix have been tried and lead to basically the same 
results. 
7 The results displayed are contemporaneous effects. Due to the small effect of the serial lag, long-
term results are only slightly larger. the chances of detecting this effect at the aggregate level. Other job-seekers do not seem to 
be adequate substitutes for the “locked-in” participants. Thus, regions with relatively large 
shares of participants in job schemes in non-profit organisations and in apprenticeships 
achieve smaller numbers of matches, ceteris paribus. This negative effect is also particularly 
strong for the share of participants in active job search. At first sight, this seems surprising 
since this is a rather short programme. However, this finding can be explained by the nature 
of this programme: active job search is aimed at people who have been searching for a job 
for a relatively short time period. Short-term unemployed have the best prospects of finding a 
new job anyway. Yet these prospects are decreased because of the lower search intensity 
during participation. Another explanation is that this programme is often used as an 
instrument for screening a job-seeker’s willingness to work. If this test is passed, in many 
cases the participant is offered a subsequent programme such as vocational training. The 
remaining programmes do not exhibit significant effects for current participants. Since 
microeconometric studies find lock-in effects for these programmes, we can assume that 
there are positive substitution effects. Thus, other job-seekers replace the participants and 
consequently the aggregate number of matches does not depend on the share of current 
participants. 
Turning to the former participants, we recognise the patterns found in the aggregate analysis. 
However, three programmes have significantly positive effects. Regions with a large share of 
former participants in wage subsidies achieve a higher number of matches, ceteris paribus. 
This indicates that after completing the programme there are favourable effects for the 
participants which are at least not entirely counterbalanced by negative effects on non-
participants. This result is remarkable since this particular kind of programme is often 
suspected of causing strong negative indirect effects. Apprenticeships and job schemes in 
non-profit organisations and socioeconomic enterprises also have significantly positive 
effects on the matching efficiency. Due to their long duration, the positive effects of these 
programmes would not have been discovered if the analysis had not distinguished between 
current and former participants.
8  
By considering some examples which are typical for the respective ALMP programmes, we 
try to get an idea of the actual magnitude of the effects obtained previously. For each 
programme, we select a region whose job-seeker rate and accommodation ratio of the 
respective programme are close to the national averages. Then we calculate the 
counterfactual effect on the number of job-seekers if the number of current and former 
participants is increased by 10 percent. These effects are displayed in Table 4. In the district 
                                                 
8 Finally, the coefficient of former participants in job training is significantly smaller than zero. However, 
this effect is very unstable and disappears when the regions in the state of Upper Austria are 
excluded from the estimation. of Leoben, for example, there are 53 current and 35 former participants who have received 
wage subsidies on 31
st March 2007. A counterfactual increase of 10 percent means that the 
number of current and former participants rises by 5.3 and 3.5 persons respectively. The 
increase in the number of current participants has only a very small expected effect on the 
number of matches of 0.27. The effect of the increase in the number of former participants is 
remarkably stronger: we expect an increase of one match. 
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6. Beveridge curve 
6.1.  Specification and estimation 
The second approach to analyse the effects of ALMP on regional labour markets is the 
Beveridge curve. If ALMP is effective at the macroeconomic level, the intensity of 
programmes should decrease unemployment, ceteris paribus. We model the log job-seeker 
rate as a function of the log vacancy rate, the intensity of ALMP programmes, control 
variables and fixed effects for both regions and periods.
9 The intensity of the ALMP 
programmes is measured by their accommodation ratio, which is defined as the stock of 
participants in a certain programme relative to the number of job-seekers (Calmfors and 
Skedinger 1995).  
Again, a serial lag of the dependent variable is needed to take adjustment mechanisms into 
account. Compared to the matching function, we expect these mechanisms to be slower 
because of the high persistence of unemployment due to hiring and firing costs, labour 
hoarding and insider-outsider behaviour (cf. Hamermesh 1993; Layard, Nickell and Jackman 
1991). Hence, it could be some time before the job-seeker rate reacts to shifts in the intensity 
of ALMP. Consequently, we add several lags of the dependent variable. Furthermore, due to 
the lock-in effect, it could also be some time before the desired (and undesired) effects of the 












rt k rt rt rt x accr L VR L JSR L JSR   (10) 
                                                 
9 We cannot use the unemployment rate as the dependent variable since programme participants are 
not counted as unemployed. This leads to a tautology where participation always reduces 
unemployment.  Again, the unit of observation is the regional branch office r  at time t .  rt JSR  is the job-
seeker rate (unemployed people and programme participants relative to the labour force) and 
rt VR  is the vacancy rate.  t x  is a vector of control variables and fixed time and regional 
effects. 
k
rt accr  is the accommodation ratio of programme k .  ) ( 1 L ,  ) ( 2 L  and  ) (L j  are 
polynomials in the lag operator, i.e. each of the respective variables is not only included at 
time t, but also with its values of the L previous quarters. In the following analysis, we use 
four lags to take into account a whole year, thus controlling for seasonal fluctuations. Again, 
the lagged dependent variable is endogenous. In contrast to the matching model, we do not 
use the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator. In cases where the autoregressive 
parameter is large (but still significantly smaller than unity), further lagged values of the 
dependent variable are weak instruments for the lagged dependent variable in the first 
differenced equation. So we use the Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimator, which 
uses a second equation in levels to provide an additional set of internal instruments (cf. 
Baltagi 2008).  
In this approach, the possible endogeneity of the accommodation ratios poses an additional 
problem. Empirical studies show that the ALMP spending of different countries is positively 
correlated with the unemployment rate (cf. Grubb 1994; OECD 1994). If this is the result of a 
policy reaction function, the causal direction is no longer clear, which leads to simultaneity 
(cf. Calmfors and Skedinger 1995). This problem might be less severe in Austria compared 
to other countries. Beginning in 1995, the AMS strongly extended its spending on ALMP 
nationwide, not taking into account the variation of development of the unemployment rate in 
different regions. However, it could also be assumed that regional branch offices adjust the 
mix and intensity of their programmes to the situation on the local labour market. For 
example, wage subsidies seem to be a better choice in tight labour markets than vocational 
training schemes (cf. Hujer et al. 2006). However, valid instruments are difficult to find. 
Calmfors and Skedinger (1995) argue that the number of seats held by conservative parties 
in the government might be a good instrument. Yet, since these data do not vary within 
states and between quarters, it is still not a useful instrument in our setting. We thus rely on 
further lagged values of the accommodation ratios as internal instruments. To fully utilise the 
relatively small number of periods, all available lags are used as instruments. 
6.2.  Empirical results 
Table A 1 displays the structural parameters of the system GMM estimator for the Beveridge 
curve. The Sargan test again does not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
valid. Higher order autocorrelation in the error terms is not indicated by the Arellano-Bond test, either. We are therefore confident that the endogeneity of the accommodation ratios is 
successfully accounted for and the interpretation of causal effects is possible. 
The serial lags of the dependent variable add up to 0.91. Though about 3.5 standard 
deviations smaller than unity, this value is large enough to support the assumption that 
unemployment is very persistent and adjustment mechanisms take much longer than just 
one quarter. Only three of the control variables show a significant effect on the job-seeker 
rate. Regions with large shares of young and highly qualified job-seekers have lower job-
seeker rates, ceteris paribus. This can be explained by the perception that many firms 
remunerate their employees according to the seniority principle, which makes it cheaper to 
hire young applicants, while vocational training commonly reduces the chances of being 
unemployed. The negative coefficient of the share of long-term job-seekers should not be 
interpreted as a causal effect. However, there is a very plausible explanation: regions with 
low unemployment rates often have a large share of long-term job-seekers. When the 
situation on a labour market is favourable for a longer period of time, it can be expected that 
only job-seekers with particular employment handicaps will remain without employment. 
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To summarise the results for the ALMP programmes, contemporaneous effects and steady 
state effects are displayed in Table 5.
10 Half of the contemporaneous effects of ALMP 
programmes are not significant. This is in line with the assumption that job-seekers reduce 
their search intensity during participation in a programme. This does not affect the job-seeker 
rate since the individual lock-in effect does not change the aggregate number of job-seekers. 
Job training and job schemes in non-profit organisations even have significantly negative 
effects. Note that this does not necessarily mean that there is a favourable effect at the 
individual level since participants remain in the group of job-seekers during participation in an 
ALMP programme. It is more plausible to assume that there are indirect effects caused by 
the programmes themselves. The target group of job training is people who have generally 
poor prospects of finding a job. In order to carry out such a programme, intensive supervision 
of the participants is necessary. An increase in the number of participants could create new 
jobs for supervisors and thus reduce the unemployment rate. While this effect is very 
                                                 
10 The steady state effects that take temporal adjustment mechanisms into account are calculated as 
) ( 1 4 3 2 1
4 3 2 1 0 , where  4 ,..., 0 ,k k  are the structural parameters of the 
respective accommodation ratio and its lags and  4 ,..., 1 ,m m  are the structural parameters of 
the lags of the dependent variable. Uncertainty estimates are calculated using the delta method. volatile,
11 the same argument could apply for job schemes in non-profit organisations. Here, 
the reduction of labour costs could also create a favourable effect. The positive but small 
effect of orientation indicates the presence of a lock-in effect. If participants would also have 
found a job without participating in this programme, then an increase of the accommodation 
ratio would result in an increase in the rate of job-seekers, compared to other regions. 
In the long run, both active job search and orientation have significantly positive effects. Note 
however, that participants in these programmes are not intended to find a job directly after 
participation. Instead, these programmes are meant to prepare job-seekers for participation 
in other programmes like wage subsidies. Thus, this effect could be explained by job-seekers 
who participate in a subsequent programme. The negative effect of job training persists in 
the long run. Aside from the job-creating effect there could also be matches for job-seekers 
who would not have had any chance of finding a job without participating in this programme. 
The negative effect of job schemes in non-profit organisations vanishes in the long run. This 
could be due to a displacement effect caused by competition between subsidised and non-
subsidised establishments on the regular labour market. The favourable effects could be 
counterbalanced in the long run and thus the regional job-seeker rate is not reduced. Neither 
of the two kinds of vocational training programmes nor apprenticeships have a long-term 
effect on the job-seeker rate. It can be argued that these programmes were successful at the 
individual level and increased the participants’ employability. However, after completing the 
programme, they just became perfect substitutes for other job-seekers. Since they all 
compete for the same number of vacancies, any macroeconomic effect is again 
counterbalanced. Finally, wage subsidies show the expected effect. After a lock-in in the 
short run, former participants seem to find jobs without reducing other job-seekers’ chances. 
This can be explained by the acquisition of firm-specific human capital during participation in 
the scheme and the ability to apply for a job while in a state of employment. This even allows 
the participants to compete with job-to-job changers. 
Due to the high persistence in unemployment, it can take a long time until the steady state 
equilibriums are reached after a change in an accommodation ratio. To consider the impacts 
within more realistic periods of time, we calculated response paths as the cumulated effects 
within twelve quarters (cf. Greene 2008, p. 686), presented in Table 6. We can see that it 
must take substantially longer than the displayed 12 periods for the effects to reach their 
steady states. 
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11 Again, it disappears when Upper Austria is excluded from the estimation. In the empirical analysis of the matching function in section 5.2, the weighted average of the 
dependent variable in nearby regions has been included. This has been done to take into 
account the spatial interdependencies between the nearby regions. However, for the 
estimation of the Beveridge curve we do not use a spatial approach. To test the robustness 
of our specification, we add a spatially lagged dependent variable to this model and again 
use the quasi-ML estimator of Lee and Yu (2010) for spatial dynamic panel data. The results 
are displayed in Table A 2. Again, there is no substantial difference from the findings of the 
original model. Remarkably, the coefficient of the spatial lag is not significant. This indicates 
that it is not necessary to take spatial interdependencies into account in this model. This is 
surprising since it is very plausible that the share of job-seekers has a strong effect on 
nearby regions. However, the residual spatial variation in the development of the job-seeker 
rate, which has not been captured by the model, particularly by the serial lags, could be small 
due to the high persistence of this variable. It thus seems that the original model is the 
efficient one and we restrict our inference to this one. 
Again, the interpretation of the actual magnitude of these effects is not trivial. In this log linear 
model, a coefficient can be approximately interpreted as an elasticity, i.e. the change in the 
job-seeker rate as a percentage due to a one-percent change in an accommodation ratio. To 
permit a clearer impression of the extent to which an increase in an accommodation ratio 
changes the number of job-seekers, we also calculate counterfactual effects for the same 
typical branch offices as in section 5.2. Table 7 displays the calculative change in the number 
of job-seekers that would occur after 12 quarters if the number of participants were increased 
by ten percent. We assume that these participants are taken out of the set of job-seekers 
and consequently that the denominator of the job-seeker rate does not change. Regarding 
the example of Leoben, we see that there are 2173 job-seekers and a job-seeker rate of 8.47 
percent. There are 82 participants who receive wage subsidies. Increasing this number by 
ten percent or roughly eight persons would cause a decrease in the regional job-seeker rate 
of 0.04 percentage points to 8.43 percent. This corresponds to a decrease in the number of 
job-seekers by 10. 
 
Table 7 around here 
7. Comparative analysis 
In the previous two sections, the effects of ALMP on two important labour market outcomes 
have been analysed separately. In each model, only the net effect of a programme could be 
considered, and it is not possible to distinguish between the direct individual treatment effect 
and the indirect effects at the macro level. To provide a more in-depth view of the channels of functionality of ALMP, the findings of the matching function and the Beveridge curve for 
each programme are considered simultaneously in this section. 
Vocational training and allowance for course costs 
There is no evidence that either of these programmes has an effect either on the matching 
process or on the job-seeker rate at the regional level. Considering the high number of 
participants, this finding is rather disappointing. However, it was not unexpected since 
microeconometric evaluation studies also found only small effects on the employment 
opportunities of former participants and the duration of their unemployment spells (cf. Lutz, 
Mahringer and Pöschl 2005; Lechner and Wiehler 2007a; b).
12 Since there is no favourable 
treatment effect at the individual level, it is not surprising that no macro effect is observed 
either. The individual lock-in effect does not emerge at the macro level for current 
participants. Obviously, there is a positive substitution effect that leads to a redistribution of 
employment opportunities from participants to non-participants. 
Wage subsidies 
Wage subsidies are the most successful measures of the programmes considered. In 
regions with large shares of (former) participants in this programme a higher number of 
matches and a lower job-seeker rate are expected. While the observed net effect can still be 
supposed to be a combination of the treatment effect and possible indirect effects, the 
favourable effects seem to dominate. Since the effect on the number of matches is positive, 
former participants do not simply substitute other job-seekers. Moreover, the negative effect 
on the job-seeker rate suggests that participants do not replace other workers, nor is there a 
displacement of non-subsidised establishments. However, no information can be gained to 
quantify deadweight losses, i.e. the employment of former participants that would have 
happened even if the person concerned had not participated in this programme. 
Active job search and orientation 
These two programmes seem to induce the strongest adverse effects. While the number of 
current participants in active job search reduces the number of matches, there is no positive 
effect from former participants in either of the programmes. Obviously there is no increase in 
the job-seekers’ productivity due to the short duration. Since these programmes are meant to 
prepare participants for subsequent programmes, a lock-in effect does not evolve before the 
end of the programme. Hence, a small increase in the job-seeker rate can be observed in the 
subsequent quarters. 
                                                 
12 Lechner and Wiehler (2007a) find for three labour market programs positive employment effects 
between 3 and 5% and for one measure an effect of about 10% for women only. However, since 
it is difficult to separately consider male and female participants in this framework, the positive 
effect on women does not confer to the macro level. Job schemes in non-profit organisations and socioeconomic enterprises 
These programmes are suspected not only of creating strong indirect effects but also of 
stigmatising the participants themselves. However, microeconometric evaluations for Austria 
found either positive or insignificant effects. The same can be observed at the macro level. At 
first, the accommodation ratio of current participants significantly reduces the number of 
matches. This can be explained by a lock-in effect due to the long duration. Afterwards, the 
matching efficiency is improved; in regions with large shares of former participants in these 
programmes significantly higher numbers of matches can be achieved. 
A converse picture appears with regard to the effects on the job-seeker rate: an increase in 
the accommodation ratios reduces the job-seeker rate in the short run. This cannot emanate 
from the participants themselves due to the lock-in effect but rather comes from favourable 
indirect effects on non-participants. Enterprises of this type have a lower labour cost 
structure due to public aid, which can also increase the demand for non-subsidised labour. 
This effect persists for longer than three years but vanishes after all adjustment mechanisms 
have been terminated. This finding points towards a displacement effect which has not been 
considered in the matching function. In the long run, establishments that employ participants 
in these programmes seem to compete with other establishments on the regular labour 
market. Hence the effects cancel each other out, and from a regional point of view, no effects 
can be observed any longer. 
Job training 
This programme is dedicated to job-seekers with particularly severe employment handicaps. 
It is geographically concentrated in Upper Austria, a fact that shows up clearly in the results. 
There is no effect of current participants on the matching process. Obviously, there is no 
lock-in effect because participants would only have had a slight chance of finding a job 
anyway. There is a small negative effect of the share of former participants. However, this 
effect is very volatile and seems to come from Upper Austria alone. The same applies to the 
negative effect on the job-seeker rate. Since there was no effect on the number of matches, 
this effect most probably stems from an indirect effect on non-participants. Participants are 
generally individuals with severe problems, and the need to mentor them could increase 
demand for supervisors. 
Apprenticeship 
The promotion of apprenticeships steadily gained in importance during the observation 
period. The number of participants has grown particularly strongly since September 2005, 
when the “Blum-Bonus” provided financial incentives for establishments to train people 
beyond their current needs. Due to the long duration of this programme, we observe the 
expected lock-in effect of current participants. Obviously, other job-seekers are no adequate 
substitutes for the “locked-in” apprentices. After completing the apprenticeship, participants seem to benefit from the programme: a large share of former participants increases the 
number of matches. This suggests that the programme is successful in helping participants 
to find a job without reducing other job-seekers’ chances. 
The effects on the job-seeker rate are somewhat contrary. A large share of participants 
directly lowers the job-seeker rate. This is most probably due to a reduction in labour costs 
since subsidised apprentices are comparably inexpensive. Moreover, the need for monitoring 
by experienced staff could also increase labour demand. This short-run effect decreases 
over time and eventually becomes insignificant. This can be explained by establishments 
taking on more apprentices than needed because of the “Blum-Bonus”. After participation, 
apprentices increase their chances of finding non-subsidised employment. However, this 
simply makes them perfect substitutes for non-subsidised apprentices. In the end, both 
groups have to compete for a constant number of vacancies and therefore any effect on the 
job-seeker rate vanishes. 
8. Conclusions 
Austrian unemployment rates have been fairly moderate compared to other European 
countries. Nevertheless, the Austrian government recognises the importance of labour 
market policy and has steadily increased its spending on programmes of active labour 
market policy. This makes Austria a particularly interesting country for analysing the effects 
of ALMP. The study at hand intends to provide insights into whether a range of eight 
programme categories has favourable effects on labour market outcomes and which of them 
are particularly successful. 
Most studies of ALMP, and especially the previous ones looking at Austria, are 
microeconometric analyses that measure the direct treatment effects on programme 
participants. Since no aggregate effect can be expected when individual participants do not 
benefit from a measure, a microeconometric analysis must always be the basis of any 
evaluation study. However, this approach does not take into account that there can be 
manifold effects on non-participants. Instead of looking at the effects on individual 
performance, the macroeconometric approach analyses whether ALMP represents a net 
gain for the whole economy.  
In the present study, we determine the impact of ALMP on the number of matches and the 
regional job-seeker rate as two important aggregate labour market outcomes. One major 
finding is that the individual lock-in effect of most programmes is compensated by positive 
substitution effects. Participants who reduce their search intensity thus seem to be replaced 
by other job-seekers. In the long run, only a few programmes result in favourable effects. 
Regions with large shares of former participants in socioeconomic enterprises, wage 
subsidies and apprenticeships have significantly higher numbers of matches. However, only wage subsidies have a negative impact on the regional job-seeker rate. The other 
programmes seem to be subject to substitution or displacement effects where participants 
are enabled to compete with other job-seekers and subsidised establishments displace non-
subsidised ones. 
It must be borne in mind that only economic outcomes were considered in this study. ALMP 
programmes are carried out for several other reasons as well. The present framework is not 
able to analyse psychological or sociological dimensions. Being unemployed increases the 
probability of mental and physical health problems (e.g. Linn, Sandifer and Stein 1985) and 
reduces life expectancy (e.g. Moser, Goldblatt, Fox and Jones 1987). In times of high 
unemployment, these individual effects add up to a severe problem at the aggregate level. 
Taking part in an ALMP programme might give participants a perspective and dampen these 
adverse effects. Another important aspect of ALMP programmes is that they could slow 
down or even prevent the depreciation of human capital during prolonged spells of 
unemployment. We can thus conclude that while there is evidence that supports the 
effectiveness of several ALMP programmes on two relevant economic labour market 
outcomes, the importance of other measures should not be denied prematurely.  
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Figure 1: Number of participants in the most important programmes at federal level 
 
 Table 1: Yearly averages of job-seekers and participants 
Year  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Unemployed  223764  251033  263000  265496  276047  263645  248590 
Sum of all participants  41753  43722  48114  50049  60587  81872  80108 
Active job search   5056  5139  6437  5003  2637  1971  1978 
Job training   1073  1109  980  988  1073  941  963 
Orientation  2561  3552  3065  2801  4142  4371  4266 
Vocational training  11723  13342  16226  20047  24660  30780  24693 
Allowance for course costs   2943  3852  4727  4650  6314  8761  5758 
Schemes in non-profit organisations   3452  4077  4559  4545  5541  7203  7638 
Wage subsidies   11358  9137  8665  8097  8512  10275  9094 
Apprenticeships  3588  3514  3455  3919  7709  17569  25720 
 Table 2: Results for the matching function (aggregated ALMP) 
Dep. var: log number of matches 
Simple matching 
function  Extended matching function 
             
                    
Log number of job-seekers  1.198  ***  0.994  *** 
Log number of vacancies  0.113  ***  0.110  *** 
             
Share of (current) participants      -0.344   
Share of (former) participants      0.196   
             
             
Share of long-term job-seekers      -1.198  *** 
Share of js younger than 25      -2.003  *** 
Share of js older than 50        -0.680  ** 
Share of js with migration background      -0.313   
Share of low-skilled js        0.859  *** 
Share of high-skilled js        0.254   
Share of female js        -1.422  *** 
Participation rate        0.059   
Share of employment in tertiary sector      -0.972  *** 
                    
             
Observations      2408    2408   
Groups        86     86    
             
levels of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%         
(based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors)       
all models estimated with both regional and time fixed effects     
  
Table 3: Results for the matching function (disaggregated ALMP, with and w/o spatial component) 
Dep. variable: log number of matches  Without spatial  With spatial    
      component    component   
                    
Spatially lagged log matches      0.270  *** 
Serially lagged log matches  0.085  ***  0.101  *** 
             
Log number of job-seekers  1.318  ***  0.912  *** 
Log number of vacancies  0.136  ***  0.082  *** 
             
Active job search            
  current    -1.602  **  -1.657  *** 
  former    0.379    0.066   
Job training            
  current    3.061  **  0.332   
  former    -0.365    -2.011  *** 
Orientation              
  current    -0.562    -0.394   
  former    0.220    -0.003   
Vocational training           
  current    0.161     0.086   
  former    0.208     0.146   
Allowance for course costs          
  current    -0.110     -0.266   
  former    -0.167     -0.169   
Non-profit organisations   
  current    -0.205    -0.903  ** 
  former    0.037     1.487  *** 
Wage subsidies            
  current    0.287     -0.280   
  former    2.045  ***  1.349  *** 
Apprenticeships           
  current    -1.293  ***  -0.446  ** 
  former    2.302  ***  3.101  *** 
             
Share of long-term job-seekers  -0.881  ***  -0.933  *** 
Share of js younger than 25  -1.759  ***  -1.835  *** 
Share of js older than 50    -1.083  ***  -0.883  *** 
Share of js with migration background  0.585    -0.191   
Share of low-skilled js    0.128    0.674  *** 
Share of high-skilled js    -0.740    -0.025   
Share of female js    -0.926  ***  -1.317  *** 
Participation rate    -0.430    0.286   
Share of employment in tertiary sector  -0.936  ***  -0.863  *** 
                    
             
Observations      2236    2236   
Groups      86    86   
AR1 test      -6.20  ***     
AR2 test      -0.59       
Sargan test        46.58  (p = 1)       
             
levels of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%         (based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors)       
all models estimated with both regional and time fixed effects     
  
Table 4: Counterfactual effects of a 10% increase of current and former participants in selected branch offices in the 2
nd quarter 2007 













                          
                 
Active job search   Braunau  520  10  1.0  -0.41  6  0.6    0.01* 
Job training   Liezen/Gröbming  417  9  0.9    0.07*  8  0.8  -0.36 
Orientation   Spittal/Drau  580  10  1.0   -0.11*  90  9.0   -0.01* 
Vocational training  Oberpullendorf  243  57  5.7    0.10*  212  21.2    0.64* 
Allowance for course costs   Ried im Innkreis  343  10  1.0   -0.07*  32  3.2   -0.14* 
Non-profit organisations  Bregenz  844  109  10.9  -2.28  23  2.3  0.79 
wage Subsidies   Leoben  505  53  5.3   -0.36*  35  3.5  1.16 
Apprenticeships  Bludenz  430  189  18.9  -2.13  53  5.3  4.15 
* effect is statistically insignificant                 
  
Table 5: Contemporaneous and steady-state effects for the Beveridge curve 
Dependent variable: log job-seeker rate          
           
                 
Job-seeker rate      Vacancy rate     
      contemporaneous  -0.012  * 
Steady state  0.910  ***  steady state  -0.188    
           
Active job search       Allowance for course costs    
contemporaneous  0.000     contemporaneous  0.001    
steady state  0.073  ***  steady state  0.001    
Job training       Non-profit organisations   
contemporaneous  -0.003  *  contemporaneous  -0.037  *** 
steady state  -0.040  *  steady state  -0.059    
Orientation       Wage subsidies      
contemporaneous  0.003  **  contemporaneous  -0.007    
steady state  0.065  **  steady state  -0.203  * 
Vocational training      Apprenticeships     
contemporaneous  0.003     contemporaneous  -0.049  *** 
steady state  0.197     steady state  -0.071    
                 
all explanatory variables are in logs         
levels of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%       
(based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors)     
all models estimated with both regional and time fixed effects     Table 6: Cumulative effects of the accommodation ratios 
   Active job        Vocational   Allowance for  Non-profit   Job-creation    
  search  Job training  Orientation  training  course costs   organisations  schemes   Apprenticeships 
                                  
t  0.000     -0.003  *  0.003  **  0.003     0.001     -0.037  ***  -0.007     -0.049  *** 
t+1  0.002  *  -0.003     0.004  **  -0.008     0.007  **  -0.021  ***  0.003     -0.014    
t+2  0.004  **  -0.002     0.005  **  0.018     0.007  *  -0.028  ***  -0.011     -0.011    
t+3  0.005  ***  -0.004  *  0.008  ***  0.030  **  0.003     -0.019  ***  -0.005     -0.005    
t+4  0.007  ***  -0.006  **  0.009  **  0.023     0.002     -0.035  ***  -0.023  **  -0.042  *** 
t+5  0.009  ***  -0.006  **  0.010  **  0.017     0.006     -0.027  ***  -0.020     -0.023  * 
t+6  0.011  ***  -0.006  **  0.012  **  0.035     0.006     -0.030  ***  -0.029  *  -0.017    
t+7  0.012  ***  -0.008  **  0.014  **  0.046  *  0.003     -0.025  ***  -0.027     -0.016    
t+8  0.014  ***  -0.010  **  0.015  **  0.041     0.002     -0.035  ***  -0.040  **  -0.040  ** 
t+9  0.016  ***  -0.010  **  0.016  **  0.038     0.005     -0.031  ***  -0.040  *  -0.029    
t+10  0.017  ***  -0.010  **  0.017  **  0.051     0.005     -0.032  ***  -0.046  **  -0.023    
t+11  0.018  ***  -0.011  **  0.019  **  0.060     0.003     -0.030  ***  -0.047  *  -0.024    
levels of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%                       
  
Table 7: Effects 12 quarters after a 10 percent change in the number of participants in selected branch offices in the 2
nd quarter 2007 
      Job-seekers     Effect 
Programme  Branch office  Number  Rate  Participants  % Points  Persons 
             
Active job search   Braunau  2348  6.35  11  0.01  4 
Job training   Liezen und Gröbming  2437  7.32  10  -0.01  -3 
Orientation   Spittal/Drau  2638  8.52  49  0.02  5 
Vocational training  Oberpullendorf  1212  7.89  97   0.05*   7* 
Allowance for course costs   Ried im Innkreis  1493  6.24  16   0.00*   0* 
Non-profit organisations  Bregenz  4065  8.04  112  -0.02  -12 
Wage subsidies   Leoben  2173  8.47  82  -0.04  -10 
Apprenticeships  Bludenz  2050  8.03  239   -0.02*   -5* 
* effect is statistically insignificant             3 
Appendix 
Table A 1: GMM results for the Beveridge curve 
Dependent variable: log job-seeker rate                
Variable  coeff.    s.e.    Variable  coeff.    s.e. 
                          
                 
Job-seeker rate        Vacancy rate     
t-1  0.139  ***  0.020    t  -0.012  *  0.006 
t-2  -0.013    0.029    t-1  -0.015  ***  0.005 
t-3  0.092  ***  0.022    t-2  -0.009    0.006 
t-4  0.691  ***  0.026    t-3  0.000    0.006 
          t-4  0.019  ***  0.007 
Active job search         Allowance for course costs    
T  0.000    0.001    t  0.001    0.002 
t-1  0.002  **  0.001    t-1  0.005  ***  0.002 
t-2  0.001    0.001    t-2  0.000    0.002 
t-3  0.001  *  0.001    t-3  -0.004  *  0.002 
t-4  0.002    0.001    t-4  -0.002    0.002 
Job training         Non-profit organisations   
T  -0.003  *  0.002    T  -0.037  ***  0.008 
t-1  0.001    0.002    t-1  0.022  ***  0.007 
t-2  0.000    0.002    t-2  -0.011    0.007 
t-3  -0.001    0.002    t-3  0.014    0.009 
t-4  0.000    0.002    t-4  0.006  *  0.004 
Orientation           Wage subsidies      
T  0.003  **  0.001    T  -0.007    0.005 
t-1  0.001    0.001    t-1  0.011  **  0.005 
t-2  0.001    0.001    t-2  -0.016  ***  0.005 
t-3  0.003  **  0.001    t-3  0.009    0.006 
t-4  -0.002    0.001    t-4  -0.016  ***  0.006 
Vocational training        Apprenticeships     
T  0.003    0.008    t  -0.049  ***  0.010 
t-1  -0.011    0.008    t-1  0.041  ***  0.010 
t-2  0.027  ***  0.010    t-2  -0.002    0.010 
t-3  0.008    0.006    t-3  0.010    0.009 
t-4  -0.010  *  0.006    t-4  -0.007    0.008 
                 
                 
Share of long-term job-seekers  -0.389  ***  0.08           
Share of js younger than 25  -0.252  ***  0.09           
Share of js older than 50  -0.122    0.12           
Share of js with migration 
background  -0.023    0.09           
Share of low-skilled js  0.043    0.10           
Share of high-skilled js  -1.569  ***  0.38           
Share of female js  0.047    0.07           
Participation rate  -0.114    0.23           
Share of employment in tertiary 
sector  0.005    0.06           
Intercept  -0.061    0.17           
                 
                 
                     4 
                      
Observations  1032               
Groups  86               
Period 
2005 - 
07               
AR1 test  -5.71  ***             
AR2 test  -0.71               
Sargan test  17.73  (p = 1)                
all explanatory variables are in logs           
levels of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%           
(based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors)       
all models estimated with both regional and time fixed effects     
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Table A 2: Results for the Beveridge curve, considering spatial dependencies 
Dependent variable: log job seeker rate      
       
Job seeker Rate       
spatial lag  0.026     
steady state  0.796  ***   
Vacancy rate       
contemporaneous  -0.010  *   
steady state  -0.076     
Active job search        
contemporaneous  0.000     
steady state  0.030  **   
Job training        
contemporaneous  -0.004  **   
steady state  -0.027     
Orientation        
contemporaneous  0.003  **   
steady state  0.030  *   
Qualification       
contemporaneous  0.006     
steady state  0.172  *   
Allowance to course costs      
contemporaneous  0.001     
steady state  0.041     
Charitable establishments       
contemporaneous  -0.035  ***   
steady state  -0.062     
Job creation schemes        
contemporaneous  -0.012  **   
steady state  -0.182  **   
Apprenticeship       
contemporaneous  -0.043  ***   
steady state  -0.004     
        
         
Observations  1032     
Groups  86     
Period  2005 - 07      
all explanatory variables are in logs     
levels of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, *10%   
all models estimated with both regional and time fixed effects 
 
 
 